
CASE TITLE: MUSICAL COPYRIGHT SOCIETY OF NIGERIA LTD/GTE v. FRCN LPELR-83451 (CA)
JUDGMENT DATE: 26TH MARCH, 2026
JUSTICES: ONYEKACHI AJA OTISI, J.C. A.
MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM SIRAJO, J.C.A.
RUQAYAT OREMEI AYOOLA, J.C.A.
DIVISION: LAGOS
PRACTICE AREA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
FACTS:
This is an appeal against the final decision of the Federal High Court, sitting in Lagos, delivered by Honourable Justice T.G. Ringim on the 23rd day of January, 2023, in Suit No: FHC/L/CS/1111/2012, wherein the Appellant’s suit (as Plaintiff) was dismissed following the trial Court’s refusal to assume jurisdiction to entertain the suit due to the Appellant’s alleged lack of locus standi. At the trial Court, the Appellant, as Plaintiff, initiated the suit that gave rise to this appeal against the Defendant vide a Writ of summons dated 19th September 2012, wherein the Appellant claimed some reliefs against the Defendant. Upon the service of the Writ, Statement of Claim and other processes on the Defendant, who is the Respondent in this appeal, the Respondent filed its Statement of Defence and other processes on 3 December, 2013. In the course of the trial and due to certain developments, the Appellant filed the Plaintiff’s first Amended Statement of Claim on 1st July, 2019; the Respondent also filed the 1st Amended Statement of Defence dated 19th September, 2019. The Plaintiff also filed a Reply to the Defendant’s first Amended Statement of Defence dated 20th September, 2019. However, the Respondent filed the Defendant’s Motion on Notice dated 18th March, 2022, questioning the trial Court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit due to the Appellant’s lack of locus standi. The Appellant, in response, filed a Counter Affidavit and Written Address dated 25th March, 2022. It was upon the hearing of this application that the trial Court determined the suit on the grounds that the Appellant lacked the locus standi to institute the same. Dissatisfied with the decision of the trial Court, the Appellant approached the Court of Appeal vide a Notice of Appeal filed on 6 April 2023.
ISSUES:
The appeal was determined on the following issues:
1. Was the Lower Court right when, in dismissing the suit of the Appellant, it held that the Appellant lacked locus standi to maintain this copyright infringement action?
2. Was the Lower Court right to hold that the Respondent’s Motion on Notice dated 18th March, 2022, was not an abuse of Court process?
3. Was the Lower Court right to have ignored the clear provisions of its rules and the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Nigeria Gas Co. Ltd vs Gasland Co. Ltd (2015) LPELR-42242 (CA) in its determination of the Respondent’s Motion on Notice dated 18th March, 2022?
COUNSEL SUBMISSIONS:
The Appellant argued that the lower Court erred in law when it held that it lacked the locus standi to institute the action. It submitted that the determination of locus standi must be based on the averments contained in the Statement of Claim, which clearly disclosed that the Appellant commenced the action in its capacity as owner, assignee, and exclusive licensee of the copyright works in issue. The Appellant maintained that by virtue of the relevant provisions of the Copyright Act and the Deeds of Assignment, as well as the Reciprocal Representation Agreements placed before the Court, it possessed sufficient legal interest to maintain the action. It further argued that the lower Court misconstrued the nature of the Reciprocal Representation Agreements by treating them as conferring the status of a collecting society on the Appellant, whereas the agreements merely vested in the Appellant the rights of an assignee and exclusive licensee within Nigeria. In support of these submissions, the Appellant relied on the authorities of Okonkwo vs. N.U.C. (2013) 15 NWLR (Pt.1378) 482, U.B.A Plc vs. BTL Industries Ltd (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt.904) 180, Adetona vs. Zenith Bank Plc (2011) 18 NWLR (Pt.1279) 627, M.C.S.N. (Nig.) Ltd/Gte vs. C.D.T. Ltd (2019) 4 NWLR (Pt.1661). 1. Multichoice (Nig.) Ltd vs. MCSN Ltd/Gte (2020) 13 NWLR (Pt.1742) 415, and Ladejobi vs. Oguntayo (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt.904) 177, amongst others.
The Respondent argued that the Appellant lacked locus standi to institute the action in 2012, as it instituted the suit in a representative capacity, purporting to act as a Collective Management Organization (CMO) by representing numerous copyright owners (more than fifty), including foreign CMOs, collecting and distributing royalties, and suing for multiple copyright infringements in a single suit without the mandatory licence or approval from the Nigerian Copyright Commission as required under Sections 17(a), (b), (c) and 39(4) of the Copyright Act, Cap. C28, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2010 (formerly the 2004 Act with similar provisions from the 1999 amendment). The Respondent submitted that the Appellant was effectively masquerading as an unlicensed CMO, operating in Nigeria by entering into Reciprocal Representation Agreements, charging tariffs, and remitting royalties without the requisite licence, which rendered the suit incompetent and deprived the lower Court of jurisdiction, irrespective of any admission by the Appellant of operating as a CMO. The Respondent maintained that the Appellant only obtained approval as a CMO in Nigeria on 3rd April 2017, years after filing the suit in September 2012, and that cases relied upon by the Appellant, such as Musical Copyright Society of Nigeria vs. Compact Disc Tech. Ltd. & Ors. (2019) 4 NWLR (PT.1661) 1 and Multichoice (Nig.) Ltd vs. MCSN Ltd/Gte (2020) 13 NWLR (PT.1742) 415, were distinguishable because they involved rights assigned or exclusively licensed before the mandatory licensing regime under the post-1999 Copyright Act, whereas the present suit arose under the applicable post-1999 law requiring such licence for the Appellant’s mode of operation. The Respondent therefore urged this Court to uphold the lower Court’s ruling dismissing the suit for lack of locus standi and jurisdiction, as there is no miscarriage of justice warranting interference.
DECISION/HELD:
The appeal was allowed. The suit was remitted to the Chief Judge of the Federal High Court for reassignment to another Judge of the Federal High Court, Lagos Division, for hearing and determination on the merits.
RATIO:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY- COPYRIGHT: Categories of persons who have the locus standi to institute an action for copyright infringement
“I must first consider the provisions of the Copyrights (Amendment) Act of 1999, which was the applicable law as at the time this suit was instituted. The said statute provides for those who can institute an action before a Court of competent jurisdiction when there is an infringement of a copyright. By virtue of Section 16(1) of the Copyrights (Amendment) Act of 1999, the owner, assignee or exclusive licensee of a copyright is entitled to institute an action for the enforcement of an infringement of the copyright. The section provides as follows:
Subject to this Act, infringement of copyright shall be actionable at the suit of the owner, assignee or an exclusive licensee of the copyright, as the case may be, in the Federal High Court exercising jurisdiction in the place where the infringement occurred; and in any action for such an infringement, all such relief by way of damages, injunction, accounts or otherwise shall be available to the plaintiff as is available in any corresponding proceedings in respect of infringement of other proprietary rights.
In addition, Section 17 of the Copyrights (Amendment) Act of 1999 provides for other persons as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act or any other law, no action for the infringement of copyright or any right under this Act shall be commenced or maintained by any person- (a) carrying on the business of negotiating and granting of licences; (b) collecting and distributing royalties in respect of copyright works or representing more than fifty owners of copyright in any category of works protected by this Act, unless it is approved under section 39 of this Act to operate as a collecting society or is otherwise issued with a certificate of exemption by the Commission.
To better understand this, Section 39 of the Copyrights (Amendment) Act of 1999 provides as follows:
1) A Collecting Society (in this section referred to as “a society”) may be formed in respect of any one or more rights of copyrights owners for the benefit of such owners, and the society may apply to the Commission for approval to operate as a collecting society for the purpose of this Act.
2) The Commission may approve a society if it is satisfied that-
(a) it is incorporated as a company limited by guarantee.
(b) its objects are to carry out the general duty of negotiating and granting copyright licences and collecting royalties on behalf of copyright owners and distributing them to them;
(c) it represents a substantial number of owners of copyright in any category of works protected by this Act; in this paragraph of this subsection, “owners of copyright” includes owners of performers’ rights;
(d) it complies with the terms and conditions prescribed by regulations made by the Commission under this section.
3) The Commission shall not approve another society in respect of any class of copyright owners, if it is satisfied that an existing approved society adequately protects the interest of that class of copyright owners.
4) It shall be unlawful for any group of persons to purport to perform the duties of a society without the approval of the Commission as required under this section of this Act.
8) For the purposes of this section—
“Collecting society” means an association of copyright owners which has as its principal objectives the negotiating and granting of licences and the collecting and distributing of royalties in respect of copyright works;
“group of persons”” includes a body corporate.
In the instant case, the Appellant pleaded, both in the reliefs sought and in the body of its Amended Statement of Claim, that it instituted the action in its capacity as owner, assignee and/or exclusive licensee of the copyright works allegedly infringed by the Respondent. The Appellant further relied on Deeds of Assignment and Reciprocal Representation Agreements as the juridical basis of its interest in the works forming part of its repertoire. These averments are not idle or gratuitous. As seen above, by Section 16(1) of the Copyright Act, infringement of copyright is actionable at the suit of the owner, assignee or exclusive licensee of the copyright. The language of the provision is plain and admits of no ambiguity. It confers a direct right of action on any person who sues in any of the stated capacities. Thus, once a claimant pleads facts bringing itself within any of those recognized capacities, it has, at least prima facie, disclosed sufficient legal interest to approach the Court.
The lower Court, however, took the view that, notwithstanding the Appellant’s repeated description of itself as owner, assignee and/or exclusive licensee, other averments in the pleadings showed that the Appellant was in substance acting as an unapproved collecting society and therefore lacked locus standi by reason of Sections 17 and 39 of the Act. I have given anxious consideration to that reasoning. It is true that some of the averments in the Statement of Claim, particularly those relating to the Appellant’s representation of affiliated organisations, administration of repertoire, publication of tariffs, grant of licences, and collection of royalties, reveal operational features commonly associated with a collecting society. It is also true that the Appellant pleaded that its formal approval as a Collecting Management Organisation came on 3rd April, 2017, which was after the institution of this action in 2012.
However, in my respectful view, those averments, standing alone, do not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the Appellant lacked locus standi to institute the present action. The critical point is that the Appellant did not frame its claim merely as a body suing in a representative capacity on behalf of a multitude of copyright owners as such. Rather, its pleaded case was that the rights sought to be enforced had vested in it as owner, assignee and/or exclusive licensee. In determining locus standi, the Court must be careful not to conflate a claimant’s broader operational profile with the specific juridical capacity in which it has approached the Court in the suit before it. Sections 17 and 39 of the Act no doubt regulate the activities of collecting societies and prohibit a person from carrying on the business of negotiating and granting licences, collecting and distributing royalties, or representing more than fifty copyright owners without the requisite approval of the Commission. But those provisions, in my considered view, cannot be construed in a manner that completely defeats the express right of action vested by Section 16(1) in an owner, assignee or exclusive licensee, unless the pleadings clearly show that the claimant’s case is founded purely on an unlicensed representative or collecting capacity and not on any proprietary or exclusive interest recognised by law.
Put differently, the mere fact that a claimant’s operations may exhibit some of the features of a collecting society does not, without more, extinguish its right to sue where it pleads that it is the owner, assignee or exclusive licensee of the copyright works in issue. To hold otherwise would amount to reading Section 17 as having silently overridden Section 16(1), a construction which the language of the statute does not warrant. Courts are enjoined to read statutory provisions harmoniously, not in a manner that renders one otiose or destructive of the other. In the instant appeal, the Appellant’s pleadings disclosed that it asserted enforceable rights in the musical works as owner, assignee and/or exclusive licensee. Whether those rights would ultimately be proved by evidence at the trial is an entirely different matter. At the threshold stage of determining locus standi, the Court is not concerned with the success or otherwise of the claim, but only with whether the pleadings disclose a legally cognizable interest entitling the claimant to be heard. In my view, they do. I am therefore unable to agree with the lower Court that the Appellant’s locus standi was defeated merely because certain averments in the pleadings also pointed to activities associated with a collecting society. Those averments may become relevant in the substantive determination of the scope, validity, or enforceability of the rights claimed, but they were not sufficient, at this preliminary stage, to rob the Appellant of standing where the same pleadings clearly asserted proprietary and exclusive interests recognised by Section 16(1) of the Act. Accordingly, I hold that the Appellant had the requisite locus standi to institute the action.” Per SIRAJO, J.C.A.
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