CASE TITLE: OLUTOMILAYO V. A. G. FEDERATION & ANOR LPELR-82644(CA)
JUDGMENT DATE: 12TH DECEMBER, 2025
JUSTICES: DANLAMI ZAMA SENCHI, J.C.A.
ABDULAZEEZ MUHAMMED ANKA, J.C.A.
UWABUNKEONYE ONWOSI, J.C.A.
PRACTICE AREA: LABOUR LAW
FACTS:
This appeal borders on Labour Law.
This is an appeal against the ruling of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, Lagos Judicial Division, delivered on the 15th of April, 2015 by the Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip.
The Appellant commenced proceedings at the trial Court on 3 April 2014 by Originating Summons, seeking leave to apply for judicial review and an order of mandamus against the 2nd Respondent. He deposed that he had exhausted all available domestic remedies in respect of the intra-union dispute, supported by documentary exhibits, including notice of the dispute to PENGASSAN in compliance with the Trade Disputes Act and a formal request to the Minister of Labour and Productivity to exercise his statutory powers by appointing a conciliator or taking other steps provided by law.
While the suit was pending, the 2nd Respondent convened a meeting between the Appellant and PENGASSAN at his Lagos office, which failed to resolve the dispute. Thereafter, the 2nd Respondent entered a conditional appearance and filed a counter-affidavit and written address out of time, while the 1st Respondent took no steps in the proceedings. The Appellant subsequently filed a further affidavit and reply on points of law.
On 17 December 2014, the trial Court suo motu raised two issues for determination and directed parties to address the Court thereon. Only the Appellant complied. After taking oral submissions based solely on the Appellant’s address, the Court reserved ruling.
In its ruling delivered on 15 April 2015, the trial Court held that an individual cannot declare a trade dispute and that no juristic body known as the Registered Trustees of PENGASSAN existed against whom such dispute could be declared. The Court accordingly dismissed the Originating Summons as incompetent and awarded costs of ₦100,000.00 against the Appellant.
The Appellant was dissatisfied with the decision of the trial Court and therefore filed this appeal.
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION:
The Court determined the appeal on the following issues:
1. Whether the learned trial Judge was right in holding that an individual cannot validly declare a trade dispute under the Trade Disputes Act, Cap T8, LFN, 2004?
2. Whether the learned trial Judge was not right in holding that “The Registered Trustees of PENGASSAN” is not a person known to law for a dispute to be declared against it?
3. Whether it can be said that the conduct of the case was consistent with the Appellant’s right to fair hearing, vis-à-vis the trial Court raising the issue of misnomer suo motu and deciding same without full consideration of the facts and authorities canvassed.
4. Whether the learned trial Judge was right in awarding the sum of N100,000.00 as costs to the Respondent having regard to the entire circumstances of the case.
COUNSEL SUBMISSIONS:
Counsel reinstated that the provision of Section 14(b) of the Interpretation Act emphatically states that words in the singular include the plural, and words in the plural include the singular. Counsel argued that in exercising its interpretative jurisdiction the trial Court failed to take cognizance of the literal interpretation of the law which emphasized that “words in singular include plural and vice versa.”
Counsel submitted that in any event, Section 45 of the Trade Unions Act cannot be read in isolation of Section 47, expressly requiring publication in the official gazette for a name listed in the schedule to have legal validity.
Counsel to the Respondent submitted that the conduct of proceedings before the trial Court did not violate the Appellant’s constitutional right to fair hearing under Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). That the essence of fair hearing is that no party should be condemned unheard, and that each party is afforded an equal opportunity to present its case.
Counsel submitted that a party alleging denial of fair hearing must show specific instances of the alleged breach and the miscarriage of justice occasioned by the alleged breach. Counsel relied on the case Angadi v. P.D.P. (2018) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1641) 1, @ (P. 36, paras. C-D).
Counsel contended that the record shows that the parties were afforded opportunity to address the Court on the competence of the suit on two points i.e, whether the Appellant as an individual is capable of declaring trade dispute under the TDA and whether the PENGASSAN is a juristic person that a trade dispute can be declared against.
Counsel submitted that the fact that the Court, in its ruling, found against the Appellant on the issue of misnomer does not amount to denial of fair hearing. The Supreme Court has clarified that fair hearing is not measured by the outcome of the case but by the opportunity given to be heard. Counsel relied on the cases of Newswatch Comm. Lid v. Atta (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt. 993) 144 @ Pp. 181-182, paras. H-A; Ekiti State v. Olubunmo (2017) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1551) 1.
DECISION/HELD:
The appeal was dismissed.
RATIO:
LABOUR LAW – TRADE DISPUTE: Whether an individual can declare a trade dispute alone
“…the case law authorities over time have recognized that an individual cannot declare a trade dispute alone; it is a process reserved for a party to the dispute or the relevant Minister. I must add that the process typically involves a trade union or employer initiating the dispute, followed by specific legal procedures like conciliation and arbitration, and the Minister of Labour may step in if necessary. Also, an individual employee’s primary recourse is to report the issue through their union, which can then formally raise the dispute on their behalf.
I agree with the position of the trial Court when the Court held that;
“Case law authorities over time have recognized the collective/individual labour dispute categorization. In this sense, prior to 2006 when the NIC Act of that year was promulgated, this Court consistently held that its jurisdiction over trade disputes meant that its jurisdiction was over collective labour disputes, not individual labour disputes. See, for instance, Chemical & Non-Metallic Products Senior Staff Association v. Benue Cement Co. Plc 20051 2 NLLR (Pt. 6) 446 at especially pp. 470 – 475. The reasoning by this Court was hinged on the fact that the jurisdiction conferred on this Court was principally in respect of settling ‘trade disputes’, which term was defined by Section 48(1) of the TDA as any dispute between employers and employees or between workers and workers. This Court reasoned that because the definition referred to workers in the plural, it must be read as excluding an individual worker. But even at this, the Court in deserving cases permitted exceptions now and then especially when its interpretation jurisdiction was raised. This posture of the Court, of course, did not go down well with especially academic commentators. For instance, Prof. E. Uvieghara in his book, Labour Law in Nigeria (Malthouse Ltd: Lagos), 2001 at 431 is quite emphatic on the view that even under the TDA set-up, individuals can access this Court arguing that Section 14(b) of the Interpretation Act states that in construing statutes, the singular includes the plural and vice versa. Despite this view point, this Court stuck to its view that individuals generally could not access this Court. The position, however, changed regarding access to this Court by individuals since the enactment of the NIC Act 2006. In Mr. Godwin Tosanwumi v. Gulf Agency Shipping Nigeria Limited unreported Suit No. NIC/18/2006 the ruling of which was delivered on 14 June 2007, this Court reviewed the situation and upheld the right of individuals to access this Court directly without having to go through the processes of Part I of the TDA as the applicant in the instant suit presently wants to do. However, despite acknowledging that individuals can come directly to this Court to ventilate their grievances, this Court still retained the rule that once it is a trade dispute, recourse for redress has to be through the processes of Part I of the TDA. In other words, this Court does not have original jurisdiction over trade disputes although it has over individual labour/employment disputes. This being the case, the law has always and accordingly been that individuals cannot declare trade disputes since they cannot approach the processes of the TDA as individuals.”
See page 220 of the Record of Appeal.
From the above provision of the law the power to declare, report, and process a trade dispute rests with trade unions and employers’ associations. Sections 3, 4, and 5 of the Trade Disputes Act reinforce this position by outlining the procedure for the reporting of a trade dispute. Section 3(1) requires that disputes be reported to the Minister of Labour by the parties to the dispute or their representatives, not by an individual employee.” Per ONWOSI, J.C.A.
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